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This is an internal report.  It may contain results or conclusions that are
only preliminary and should therefore be treated -accordingly.  It is not to be
reproduced nor quoted in publications or forwarded to persons unauthorized
to receive it.
1. Introduction
A research programme is being run at Riso concerning the control room
layout and the communication between operator and instrumentation in large
industrial plants.  The aim is to find appropriate ways of presenting informa-
tion so that a quick and reliable communication can take place.
An important information channel from the plant to the operator is the
warning or alarm system by means of which the plant signals when a prede-
termined plant parameter level has been transgressed.
The warning signal initiates operator action, and the pattern of warning
signals combined with the measured data and the general plant operating
status are the basis for the operator's identification of his task.
For studies of the role of the information carried by the warning signals
in different plant conditions and operator tasks, a recording system was in-
stalled at the research reactor DR3.  The system records the time of arrival
and clearance of warning signals and the patterns of warning signals related
to these moments.
These records will enable us to analyse warning signal information in
relation to different plant conditions, plant subsystems and operator tasks
and to correlate warning conditions to plant operating history, maintenance
procedures etc.  This analysis will be carried out in co-operation with the re-
actor plant operating staff.
The system also offers the possibility to analyse operator response times,
time spent to remedy abnormal conditions and time distributions of similar
events.
Operator response times have been studied by Green et al.  UKAEA (1)
using equipment called HORATIO (Human Operator Response Analyzer and
Timer for Infrequent Occurrences).
This equipment uses an alarm lamp which lights at random intervals and
a reset button.  Response times between lamp indication and reset action was
recorded and showed a log normal distribution with mean response times
around 2. 5 sec.
While this equipment was additional to the control room instrumenta-
tion, our equipment (called HAMLET), works on the instrumentation itself and
thus adds no extra equipment to the control console.
It gives a good opportunity to collect response time information compara-
ble to the UKAEA data, and the present report gives a preliminary analysis of
the gross response times found.  When more data are available, a detailed
analysis relating data to plant conditions and operator working conditions will
be worked out.
The response times can be analysed in many ways from the recorded
data.  Thus the possible influence of the number of alarms or type of alarms
can be considered.  The effects of the time of the day or the shift Pe -riod can
be analysed.  So it is the aim of the experiment to describe important factors
in the operator's communication with an alarm console in order to gain a ba-
sis for a quantitative design and safety evaluation of such equipment.  Two
aspects of operation are considered, one concerning the safety aspects for the
plant and one concerning the daily operation, where the instrumentation is a
communication medium and a protective system for less important auxiliary
system in the plant.
2. Alarms and Incident Recording
The test equipment is installed in the control room at the DR 3 reactor.
This reactor is supervised by some 80 alarm circuits connected to transducers
either in the reactor circuits or in the different experiments.  The alarms are
displayed in front of the operator on a large panel which contains the names
o,-L-the different alarms.
Whenever a new alarm comes up, a warning bell rings.  This bell can be
reset with a push button in front of the operator.  Another push button 1 0
cm away from the bell reset button is used to reset the alarm panel, i. e. to
extinguish those alarm lamps for which the alarm condition has disappeared.
Thus the alarm lamps remain lighted (even if the alarm condition has disap-
peared) until the alarm panel reset button is activated.
A normal sequence of events is bell ringing, bell resetting and later alarm
panel resetting.  These events are named 0, P and Q events respectively.  The
times for these events are printed on tape giving hour, minutes, seconds and
tenths of seconds for the event.
I 00 msec after a P and Q event the alarm status is scanned and
punched out.
3. Preliminary Analysis
A computer programme was developed to analyse time differences be-
tween either 0 and P events and 0 and Q events or P and Q events, and to
prepare a frequency distribution of response times.  A number of conditions
concerning number of alarms, types of alarms and times can be set up so that
event times are only registered when these conditions are fulfilled.
The frequency of events during normal operation is:
0 and P events: 2.06 per hour (based on 1142 events)
Q events: 2.61 per hour (based on 1444 events)
showing that there are several alarm panel resets for each new alarm and
bell reset.
The number of alarms active when a bell reset is made, is distributed as
follows:
1 alarm active: 43%
2 alarms active: 35%
3 alarms active: 13%
4 alarms active:   3%
More than 4 active:    6%
A single run of the data for a distribution between times of P and Q
events shows a distribution which deviates from the log normal distribution.
It appears that there is a large number of very long time intervals.  Only those
Q's that are adjacent to a P are counted, and repeated Q's are disregarded.
4. Discussion of Results
This first analysis was made without a priori knowledge of the operator
habits and ways of acknowledging alarms.  It appears that the reset of the
alarm bell seems independent of the alarm status, but perhaps dependent on
the tiredness of the operator.  A nice log normal distribution shows up in ac-
cordance with other findings (1), but with slightly different response times
(means of 3. 6 sec against I sec found elsewhere).  This can be due to different
distances for reset buttons, or due to the special significance of the HORATIO
signal to the operator.
The dependence on time of the day and shift period could be further in-
vestigated when more data are available.
The response time to reset of the alarm panel does not show a log normal
distribution, and a further investigation is needed.  We have been informed
that the operator does not reset some alarms because he knows that they will
be present for some time.  This may be the reason why so many long response
times are present.
Another hypothesis may be that the operator tries to reset the alarms
very quickly in order to handle spurious alarms.  This may especially be so
when many alarms come up simultaneously.  By rejecting the special alarms
which are not reset and examining the response times as functions of number
of alarms a log normal distribution may appear, giving the possibility of inter-
comparison and significance test.
Furthermore, when more data are available the response time for spe-
cially chosen alarms could be derived, thus giving information on reset of im-
portant and unimportant alarms.
(1) A. E. Green, Safety Assessment of Automatic and Manual Protec-
tive Systems for Reactors.  A. H. S. B. (S) R 172. (1969).
 (2) A. Hald, Statistiske metoder.  Den private Ingeniørfond (1948).



